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Sumário: 
o lema central desta intervenção diz respeito ao partenariado transatlân-
tico - ligação estratégica entre us Estados Unidos c a Europa e o seu 
empenhamento na segurança europeia - com mútuos bencl'ícios e objectivos 
comuns. Destacam-se algumas áreas ue referência, nomeadamente: a situaçã6 na 
Bósnia, yue representa o muior desafio para a segurança da Europa no pús-
-guerra fria; () alargamento da NATO aos países Jl) LC,'itc Europeu: a nova 
Agenda transatlântica; as conversações para a integração da Rússia na Arquitec-
tUfa Europeia; c, o fortalecimento Ja OSCE no apoio à democracia e direitos 
humanos. 
Eli;:.ahcrh Frawley Bugley 
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Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you today. U.S. 
Ambassadors have addressed the InstiWlo da Deresa Naciunal for several years 
and this is the second time I have had the privilege. I appreeiate the opportunity 
to continue the tradition. 
The perennial subject of this talk - the role of the U.S. in European secu-
rity - is always important, but even more so in 1996 with both U.S. 
and Portuguese troops engaged in Bosnia, and with the eurrent restructuring 
of the European security architecture. [ will also touch on a relaled theme, a 
lwist on the usual formulation, and that is the role of Europc in U.S. security 
afrairs. 
Looking back over the year since [ last spoke to the Institulo, [ belieye I 
no longer have to try to convince you of the American eommitment to European 
security, the importance of an active U.S. rolc and the absolute need ror a 
transatlantic partnership. A brief review ar some of the themes I covered last 
year and developments since then illustratc my poinl: 
- [n Bosnia, we were well into the thirJ winter of war without a clear road 
to a solution in sight. Divisions hetwecn the U.S. and some allies on 
what to do were extremely frustrating, leading some commentators to 
proclaim the irrelevance of NATO to security challenges even on its 
doorstep. The horrors of the mortar attack in Tuzla anJ Serb atrocities 
afler the fali of Srebrenica were still ahead of us. 
NATO began to adapt to meet the new conditions in Europe. Enlargement 
of the Alliance was accepted in principie, PFP was engaged, and a sludy 
of the implications of enlargement was launched. 
NATO's relations wilh Russia, criticai for building stability and security 
on the continent, were frayed largely because of Russian 
misunderstandings about NATO enlargement. Historically-based 
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differences in approach to the cont1iet in Bosnia also contributed to 
Russian suspicions about NATO's motives. 
The CSCE became the OSCE and emerged from the Budapest summit 
empowered and energized for new tasks. 
And finally, in an area of great importanee to Portugal, the eompletion 
of a new Lajes Agreement designed to meet the new eonditions and 
challenges in our bilateral seeurity relations remained tanlalizingly jusl 
out of reach. 
As 1 speak to you now, I have a dramatically positive review to make of 
these areas. I do not mean lo suggest that we have reaehed final resolution on 
these issues: that is not lhe nature of international relations. However, I can 
point tu very promising developments in some difficull areas. ln my opinion, 
and Wilh no small pride. I would argue lhat Ihey prove strong U.S. engagement 
in Europe and demonstrate beyond qucslion whal lhe lransallantic parlnership 
can accomplish for lhe mutual bendil of Europe and lhe U.S. 
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- ln Bosnia, lhe situation remains ditticult and uangerous, but wc in lhe 
international cornrnunity have recollciled many af our uivisions ano 
rediscovered comlTIon purpose in mceling the greatest European sccurity 
challengc of lhe post-cold war era. The Daylon Agreemenl has pr6vided 
lhe rramework ror an cou to lhe worst armcd conflicl in Europc in hal[ 
a century. Ano, significantly, Russia and many olher former Warsaw 
Pacl adversaries will participalc wilh NATO forces in [FOR as valuable 
partners in implemcnting the peace. 
- NATO enlargement is on track. proceeding in a dcliberatc and transparent 
manner. The prucess 01' completing the enlargement study dariticd 
responsibilities as wcll as benetits to prospective new members and 
NATO mcmber nations alike. The enlargemcnl process enters lhe next 
phase lhis year, in which the Alliance will hold intensive consullalions 
wilh prospective new members. 
- The OSCE is poised lo move inlo its rightful place as a major building 
block of European security. in parI because of its participation in lhe 
peace process in Bosnia. Having cstablishcd its expertise in Bosnia in 
the areas 01' human rights monitoring. refugce care and organil.ing 
elections, the OSCE\; evolving institutional strength complements 
NATO's defense struclures as anolher huilding hlock for general European 
security. 
POLITICA EXTERNA DOS EUA 
Tilese notable develapments over the past 12 manths resonale with the 
elements Df Presidem Clinton's comprehensive strategy for European seeurity 
and transatlantie relations which I will enumerate later. The fundamental 
objective 01' our policy is to increase stabi lity and prosperity lhroughout the 
Nonh Atlantic area and Europe. The new chances for peace in the Middle East 
and Northem Ireland also owe much to the steady US. course over the past few 
years. 
The projection 01' steady, engaged leadership is the fundamental goal of the 
Clinton administration's foreign policy. This leadership, indispensable to U.S.-
European cooperation, combines a c1ear assessment of V.S. national security 
interests with the traditional concems 01' lhe American people for a strong 
moral component in U.S. foreign policy. And those interests are intimately tied 
to stability and prosperity in Europe, as they have been for nearly ali 01' lhis 
century. 
The role I am describing, however, does not imply leadership solely for its 
own sake, ar dominance. It means an active partnership with Europe for the 
mutual benefll 01' bOlh sides 01' the Atlantic. As Assistant Secretary Richard 
Holbrooke noted in his seminal «Foreign AI'fairs» article last year, lhe U.S. is 
a European power, nol ;n Europe but slill an indivisihlc part of it. We ignore 
lhis fundamental fact only at the peril ar the secllrily 01' bolh sides 01' .the 
Atlantic. 
I would also like to underline one olher aspeet 01' this pannership that may 
nol always be well understood in Europe. Active U.S. engagemenl in Europe 
is suslained in the formation 01' a heallhy, functioning partnership with Europe. 
We could not have generated or mainlained the kind of commilmenl and elTon 
we displayed in the past months without lhe cooperation 01' a strong Europe. 
«A superpower,» President Clinton said in his address to the nation on the 
Bosnia peace force, «cannot do everything everywhere and cannot do it alone.» 
So we require the continued reliahle parlnership 01' the Alliance and other 
European states which share our values and inlcrests to hclp us accomplish our 
common objectives. 
What is our principal shared common objective? It remains very much as 
it was last year: to exlend and enhanee stabilily, security and prosperity in the 
North Atlanlic area and Europe. From lhe U.S. vantage point, this consists 01' 
four key elements: 
1st the continued adaptalion and evolulion of NATO; 
2nd the ac!ivation 01' the Ncw Transallantic Agenda; 
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3rd the integratian af Russia into European security and economic 
architecture; and 
4th the engagement af a strengthened OSCE. 
ADAPTATION AND EVOLUTION OF NATO 
The process of change in NATO, underway since the London Summit in 
July 1990, is considerably more advanced than is generally understood. It 
began with changes in NATO strategy and proceeded through ehanges in 
struetures to meet new security conditions. The evolution of NATO is clearly 
visible today in the careful path toward enlargement, the establishment of the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), where politicai consultations are 
held with the enemies of just a few years ago, and Partnership for Peace (PFP), 
which is successfully developing the palteros and habits of military cooperation 
with former adversaries. PFP in particular has been a great success with 25 
partners, including Russia, and is an important feature of the European security 
landscape. PFP will help prepare potential new members of NATO for the 
responsibilities as well as the privileges of AlIiance membership. It will also 
prepare nations that will not join NATO to cooperate with the AlIiance in 
maintaining European security; PFP training has made participation in' !FOR 
possible for a number of countries. 
TIIE NEW TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA 
One of the most important new developments in our policy is the New 
Transatlantic Agenda signed at the December U.S.-EU Summit in Madrid. ln 
a very real sense, however, the Agenda is not as new as its expression in the 
Madrid document. ln the early 60's, President Kennedy foresaw a «deelaration 
of interdependence» that awaited a more perfecI union in Europe. It is based 
on our common recognition that economic prosperity and opportunity are the 
foundation of security, and has gained impetus from the encouragement and 
support the U.S. continues to give to the process of European integration. 
TheAgenda, with its long-term economic, politicai and cultural dimensions, 
is the answer to doubts that arose in some quarters after the cold war as to 
whether the U.S. and Europe stil! shared common interests and whether the 
U.S. was stil! interested in and engaged with Europe. lt has become increasingly 
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c1ear that the foundation of comrnon interests and values remains unshaken and 
serves as a tremendous asset in facing new ehallenges sueh as the dangers of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and intemational crime. Last year, 
a number of highly-respected European ligures publicized various ideas for a 
broad, struetured transatlantie partnership to carry us forward into the next 
century. Seeretary of State Christopher responded on behalf of the U.S. in a 
June 2 speeeh in Madrid in whieh he proposed a comprehensive strategy for 
European seeurity with a new emphasis on politicai, economie and global 
cooperation. The Agenda also eommits us to work together against international 
crime, terrorism and drug trafficking and to work together for the environment 
and the promotion of global trade and investment. The remarkable aehievement 
of the December signing underscores yet again the lirm .nd deepened ties of 
interdependence and partnership between the U.S .• nd Europe. 
The ehallenge now is implementation, and we will meet that ehallenge 
logether. 
INTEGRATlNG RUSSIA INTO THE EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE 
I have already touehed on this importanl aspeet of our poliey, but I would 
Iike to emphasize how important il is that wc solve ane of Europe's endllring 
security chaHenges by finding a posilive role for Russia lO play in European 
affairs. ln faet, more progress has been made than is oflen recognized. Russia 
has joined PFP and partieipates actively in the NACC. lt has obtained mueh of 
its "special relationship" with NATO in lhe 16 plus one formal. Russia was a 
member of the Bosnia eontaet group, and - perhaps most importantly - has 
eontributed troops to the Bosnia peaee force. Russia still is not fully convinced 
that it has nothing to fear from a natural process of NATO enlargement, but we 
have sueeeeded in a substantial way in providing Russia with a voiee befitting 
its importance to European security. 
STRENGTHENING THE OSCE 
The member nations of the OSCE provided il with new struetures and 
support at last Deeember's Budapest Summit to boost its role in maintaining 
security in the most eomprehensive sense. The OSCE is the forum in whieh the 
U.S. and Canada join the countries of Europe and the former Soviet Union in 
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addressing their seeurity eoneems, eontributing to a sense of stability and 
belonging to a eommunity of like-minded demoeratie nations. 
We expeet that the OSCE will be indispensable in supporting democraey 
and human rights throughout the region. Considering that Europe's major 
ehallenges now do not emanate from opposing military bloes, hut rather 
from ethnie and nation.listie tensions, territorial disputes, migration flows, 
organized crime and environmental damage, the OSCE's eomplementary role 
to NATO's provision of military seeurity is clear. The new strength of the 
OSCE in its cooperation with other bloeks of the European arehiteeture will be 
clear in the multifaceted role iI wi II play in implementing the peace in Bosni. 
in essential arcas such as human rights monitoring, organizing elections, 
reconstruetion and aiding refugees. Portugal, as host of this year's OSCE 
Summit, is taking a leading role in working with the Swiss ehairman to ensure 
an outcome th.t will serve to reinforee the vital role af the OSCE in European 
security. 
WHERE THEORY MEETS PRACTICE 
The foregoing is the strategie foreign and security policy of the Clinlon 
Administration. We believe it is coherent, logical and essential to our own 
interests and in the interests of those to whom we are so closely linked. But as 
poliey, it is I.rgely • guide; lheory as opposed to action. What [ wauld likc 10 
suggest to you now is that we. together with our European allies, actually have 
a testing ground where many 01' the hypotheses of our policies will be tesled 
by aetions. The testing ground is -Basilio. 
We did not choose Bosni. as sllch a testing ground; tragically, it presented 
itself to uS. But iI is no accident thal extraordinary U.S. politicaI, diplomatic 
and military efforts have been foellssed on thal tragic conflicl. We recognize, 
as the underlying fundamental truth in ali of the poliey pronoullccments I have 
outlined for you, that there is no stability for the U.S. if there is instability in 
Europe. What Winston Churchill said in a different conlext - with regard to the 
founding of NATO - remains timelessly true: the new warld must be kept 
engaged to redress the imbalances af the old. 
The harsh and tragie testing ground af Bosnia reminds us af another fact 
that we must keep in mind: there are 110 gains without risks. It is a highly 
arguable hypothesis that earlier aetion by NATO and lhe U.S. could have had 
the sarne positive effect of ereating an opportunity for peaee; many conditians 
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on the ground and subsequenlly in lhe polilical relalions of the parties had to 
change first. But it is absolutely certain that withuut the leadership to take the 
risks, to seize the opportunities, and to actively engage and promote the 
dialogue, the Bosnian confiict would have conlinued to tester, making an 
approach to more complete European stabilily impossible. 
ln the broadest historical sense, I believe that what we are witnessing in 
the creation of a New Transatlantic Agenda and a European security architecture 
is nothing less than lhe reassertion by Europe as a whole of the global role that 
many European nations - and not least Portugal - have played individually in 
various epochs. The evolving European role on the world slage will be vastly 
strengthened both by cooperation and unity within its own union and the 
reciprocai benefits of mutual suppart and solidarity with lhe U.S. 
The burden ofworld leadership will pose new challenges and responsibilities. 
Bosnia has taught us, however, the costs of inaction. Solving the new issues we 
face won't be easy, but lhe U.S. and Europe will do it because it is the right 
way for them to move into lhe 21 st cenlury wilh grealer securily and opporlunity 
for ali of our peoples. 
Our hopes for lhe future as we meel lhese challenges remind me of the 
words 01' Irish poet and Nobel prizewinner Seamus Hcaney, which Presidenl 
Clinton quoled during his rccent visil to Ireland. I lhink thcy are particularly 
relevant as wc reflect 00 our common hopes and gaals, and on the servi ce. 01' 
our men and women in Bosnia: 
Histor.y says, don 'f flope 
cm this sitie of lhe grave. 
But then, aI/ce iII a lifefime, 
lhe longed-for tida! WClve 
(d justice can rise IIp 
mui hope and hisfor.v rhyme. 
So hope já,- a grea{ sea change 
011 the far side (~r revenge. 
Believe lhar u furfher shore 
is reachable from here. 
Believe in mirades 
anel cures and healing wells. 
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I believe with President Clinton that we - ali of us - are indeed at a stage 
in our lives where hope and history do rhyme. Now it is our responsibility and 
our duty to seize this moment and to secure the fragile peace which we together 
have helped to forge. 
Elizabeth Frawley Bagley 
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